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Abstract
Recent behavioral and neuroimaging studies demonstrate that labeling one’s emotional experiences and perceptions alters those
states. Here, we used a comprehensive meta-analysis of the neuroimaging literature to systematically explore whether the presence
of emotion words in experimental tasks has an impact on the neural representation of emotional experiences and perceptions across
studies. Using a database of 386 studies, we assessed brain activity when emotion words (e.g. ‘anger’, ‘disgust’) and more general affect
words (e.g. ‘pleasant’, ‘unpleasant’) were present in experimental tasks vs not present. As predicted, when emotion words were pre-
sent, we observed more frequent activations in regions related to semantic processing. When emotion words were not present, we
observed more frequent activations in the amygdala and parahippocampal gyrus, bilaterally. The presence of affect words did not
have the same effect on the neural representation of emotional experiences and perceptions, suggesting that our observed effects are
specific to emotion words. These findings are consistent with the psychological constructionist prediction that in the absence of ac-
cessible emotion concepts, the meaning of affective experiences and perceptions are ambiguous. Findings are also consistent with the
regulatory role of ‘affect labeling’. Implications of the role of language in emotion construction and regulation are discussed.
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Introduction
It is often assumed that language merely labels or communicates
emotional states that have already been generated (Ekman and
Cordaro, 2011; Wood and Niedenthal, 2015). However, psycho-
logical constructionist models of emotion suggest that words that
name emotion concepts (‘fear’, ‘disgust’, ‘anger’) are in fact con-
stitutive of emotions. In these models, emotion words support
the conceptual knowledge that helps the brain make meaning of
affective sensations in a given context. In doing so, conceptual
knowledge helps ‘construct’ emotions because it transforms am-
biguous affective sensations into experiences and perceptions of
certain discrete emotions (Barrett et al., 2007; Lindquist and
Gendron, 2013; Lindquist et al., 2015a,b).
Consistent with the psychological constructionist view, a
growing body of research demonstrates the behavioral and cog-
nitive impact of emotion concept words on emotional
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experiences and perceptions (Pennebaker & Beall, 1986; Fugate
et al., 2010; Widen and Russell, 2010; Lieberman, 2011;
Lieberman et al., 2011; Kircanski et al., 2012; Kassam & Mendes,
2013; Lindquist and Gendron, 2013; Lindquist et al., 2015a, b;
Niles et al., 2015for reviews). Yet only a handful of neuroimaging
experiments have explicitly assessed how emotion concept
words impact the neural representation of emotional experi-
ences and perceptions (Banks et al., 2007; Lieberman et al., 2007;
Satpute et al. in press). We thus performed a comprehensive
meta-analysis of the neuroimaging literature on emotion to
examine whether the presence or absence of emotion concept
words in experimental paradigms alters brain activity during
experiences and perceptions of emotion. This meta-analysis
allowed us to examine whether emotion concept words consist-
ently influence the neural representation of emotions, demon-
strating that emotion concept words have more than a trivial
impact on how the brain processes affective stimuli.
Language and the psychological construction of emotion
Psychological constructionist models uniquely predict a consti-
tutive role of language in emotion. In particular, the psycho-
logical constructionist approach predicts that emotions are the
product of more basic affective and conceptual processes
(Lindquist and Barrett, 2008). Consistent with recent predictive
coding approaches to perception (Panichello et al., 2012), the psy-
chological constructionist view hypothesizes that the brain is
continuously making affective predictions about how stimuli in
the world will impact the organism, and then refining those af-
fective predictions into more specific emotional experiences and
perceptions using conceptual knowledge about emotion (e.g.
anger, disgust, fear, etc.) (Cunningham et al., 2013; Lindquist,
2013; Barrett and Simmons, 2015). The brain’s initial affective
predictions help to determine how stimuli will impact the
body—determining whether something is good, bad, arousing or
calming—and prepares the organism for action. These predic-
tions are referred to as ‘core affect’ (Russell and Barrett, 1999;
Russell, 2003) and are supported by limbic and paralimbic corti-
ces (Barrett and Bliss-Moreau, 2009; Barrett and Simmons, 2015).
In particular, a distributed network consisting of the dorsal and
ventral anterior insula, dorsal and ventral anterior cingulate cor-
tex, basal ganglia, and amygdala (i.e. a ‘salience’ or ‘ventral at-
tention’ network; Seeley et al., 2007; Lindquist et al., 2012; Barrett
and Simmons, 2015; Lindquist et al., 2016b) is hypothesized to
compute these early affective predictions. The amygdala is
thought to play a key role in this core affective network by mar-
shaling autonomic changes in the body and increasing sensory
processing to particularly uncertain and motivationally relevant
stimuli (for discussions, see Cunningham and Brosch, 2012;
Lindquist et al., 2012). Uncertainty about the meaning of a stimu-
lus suggests that the brain needs to make further predictions to
ascertain that stimulus’ impact for the organism.
The psychological constructionist account predicts that initial
affective predictions are subsequently refined into experiences
and perceptions of discrete emotions when the brain draws on se-
mantic knowledge to improve predictions about the more specific
meaning of core affective sensations in that context (e.g. that feel-
ings of unpleasantness and arousal are an indication that a stimu-
lus is disgusting vs fearful) (Cunningham et al., 2013; Lindquist,
2013; Barrett, 2014). This type of prediction is referred to as ‘con-
ceptualization’ and is supported by regions that are thought to
represent prior experiences and semantic knowledge such as the
dorsal and ventral medial prefrontal cortex, posterior cingulate
cortex, hippocampus, lateral temporal cortex, anterior temporal
lobe and the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (i.e. the ‘default net-
work’; Raichle et al., 2001; ‘association network’; Schacter et al.,
2007; ‘context network’; Bar, 2009; or ‘conceptual hub network’;
Binder, 2016) (Lindquist and Barrett, 2012; Barrett and Satpute,
2013). It is known that conceptualization helps make predictions
about the meaning of visual sensations by spontaneously retriev-
ing semantic knowledge that exerts a top-down predictive influ-
ence on ongoing perceptions (e.g. to determine if an object is a
gun vs hairdryer) (Bar, 2007; Chaumon, et al., 2014). A psychological
constructionist view predicts that one’s own internal core affect-
ive sensations (Russell, 2003; Barrett, 2006; Lindquist, 2013) or vis-
ual sensations of another person’s core affective facial muscle
movements (Barrett et al., 2007; Lindquist and Gendron, 2013) are
similarly made meaningful as instances of anger, disgust, fear,
etc. by drawing on emotion concept knowledge acquired over
prior experiences and organized by linguistic category labels such
as ‘anger’, ‘disgust’, etc. Ventral aspects of the lateral prefrontal
cortex (vlPFC), in particular, play a key role in this network by
retrieving these semantic representations (Thompson-Schill et al.,
2007) and autobiographical representations (Simons and Spiers,
2003; St. Jacques et al., 2012) of prior experiences for use in the mo-
ment. Activity within vlPFC is thus often considered evidence that
the brain is accessing the rich cache of situation-specific know-
ledge about a concept for online use.
Important to the present paper, there is much evidence that
in humans, conceptualization works in tandem with language.
Research demonstrates that language not only helps individuals
acquire new concepts (Xu, 2002; Lupyan et al., 2007) but that ac-
cess to linguistic concepts also shapes online processing of visual
sensations (Lupyan, 2012). For instance, activating linguistic con-
cepts warps memories of perceptual objects towards more cat-
egorical representations (Hemmer and Persaud, 2014), and even
shapes online visual perception (Lupyan and Spivey, 2010). The
relationship between conceptual knowledge and language is es-
pecially critical for abstract concepts such as emotion categories,
which are comprised of embodied representations of prior experi-
ences combined with culturally acquired knowledge about the
situations, bodily feelings and facial expressions associated with
a particular emotion category (Vigliocco et al., 2009; Lindquist
et al., 2015b). The psychological constructionist approach thus hy-
pothesizes that emotion words play a role in constituting emo-
tional experiences and perceptions because they help people
store and then access the conceptual knowledge about emotions
used to make predictions about the meaning of external (e.g. vis-
ual) and internal (i.e. interoceptive) sensations in the moment.
Of course, not every emotional experience or perception
occurs in the explicit presence of emotion words, or is explicitly
categorized with language. However, the psychological con-
structionist approach predicts that conceptualization occurs
implicitly when semantic knowledge about emotion categories
is used to make meaning of ambiguous affective predictions in
a given context (Lindquist and Barrett, 2008; Wilson-
Mendenhall et al., 2011). In a particular instance, an individual’s
conceptual knowledge is rapidly and implicitly integrated to
make meaning of ongoing sensory experiences, which allows
ambiguous affective sensations from the body and environment
to be made meaningful as instances of a specific emotion. For
instance, access to the linguistic concept of ‘fear’ (vs ‘anger’ or
no emotion-specific concepts) transforms unpleasant and
highly aroused core affect into an experience of fear, as indi-
cated by participants’ increased perceptions of threat in the en-
vironment (Lindquist and Barrett, 2008). Therefore, an emotion
is a constructed event that is a product of core affect, conceptu-
alization and the features of the present context.
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Importantly, according to our psychological constructionist
approach, not all words are created equally when it comes to
constructing emotional experiences and perceptions. We hy-
pothesize that words that name emotion concepts (e.g. ‘anger’,
‘disgust’, ‘fear’, ‘sadness’, ‘joy’, ‘amusement’, etc.) possess
greater predictive power than words that name affective states
(e.g. ‘pleasant’, ‘unpleasant’, ‘positive’, ‘negative’, ‘good’, ‘bad’)
insofar as emotion concept words help refine the meaning of
otherwise ambiguous core affective predictions by transforming
them into experiences and perceptions of specific emotion cate-
gories (e.g. transforming a feeling of unpleasant, high arousal
into the experience of fear vs anger; Lindquist and Barrett,
2008). We thus hypothesized that words that name emotion
concepts will be more likely than words that name affective
concepts to prompt semantic retrieval of specific instances of
prior discrete emotional experiences and perceptions.
Specifically, we predict that discrete emotion words, but not af-
fect words will help the brain make meaning of ambiguous core
affective predictions, refining those core affective representa-
tions into experiences and perceptions of anger, fear, sadness,
joy, amusement and so on.
Neuroimaging evidence for the role of language in
emotion
Most research thus far has focused on the role of language in
emotion using behavioral experiments (Lindquist and Gendron,
2013; Lindquist et al., 2015a, b, 2016a, for reviews), but growing
evidence from neuroimaging is also consistent with the idea
that emotion concepts supported by language help constitute
emotions. A meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies on emotion
(Lindquist et al., 2012) found that brain regions consistently acti-
vated across studies of semantic processing such as the dorso-
medial prefrontal cortex, ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, lateral
temporal cortex and anterior temporal lobe (Binder et al., 2009)
also showed consistent increases in activation across studies of
emotion (see Lindquist et al., 2015b for areas of consistent over-
lap during emotions and semantics). A neuroimaging study
observed that thinking about emotions, experiencing an emo-
tion, and attending to body feelings share overlapping activity
within the ‘default network’ hypothesized to support semantic
retrieval and use (Oosterwijk et al., 2012). In particular, the an-
terior temporal lobe, a brain region involved in representing se-
mantic knowledge (Patterson et al., 2007) had greater activity
during emotions as compared to general positive and negative
body feelings (Oosterwijk et al., 2012). These findings suggest
that emotional experiences and perceptions may draw on con-
ceptual knowledge of emotion during the construction of emo-
tional states.
A separate, yet compatible, line of research has specifically
investigated how the neural representation of emotion changes
when participants are asked to explicitly label their affective
states. This research finds that explicit, forced-choice labeling
of negative facial expressions during an emotion perception
task increases activity in the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex and
decreases amygdala activity (Hariri et al., 2000; Lieberman et al.,
2007). The strength of connectivity between vlPFC and amyg-
dala is also increased by the presence of emotion concept
words, which results in decreased amygdala activity (Torrisi
et al., 2013). Additionally, labeling negative emotional experi-
ences and pairing aversive stimuli with emotion category labels
reduces autonomic reactivity to threatening images (Tabibnia
et al., 2008), and increases the efficacy of exposure interventions
in clinical populations such as sufferers of public speaking
anxiety (Niles et al., 2015) and arachnophobia (Kircanski et al.,
2012). Due to the overlap of regions involved in “affect labeling”
and emotion regulation (Payer et al., 2012; but see Burklund
et al., 2014 for some subtle distinctions), it is argued that affect
labeling serves as a form of implicit emotion regulation
(Lieberman, 2011).
A neuroimaging meta-analysis of the role of language in
emotion
Although individual studies suggest that language may play a
constitutive role in emotion by transforming initial affective
predictions into experiences and perceptions of discrete emo-
tions, no study has systematically addressed this hypothesis on
a large scale. In the present report, we use a comprehensive
coordinate-based meta-analysis of the neuroimaging literature
on emotion to build upon the predictions of the psychological
constructionist approach and previous empirical findings. In
particular, we use meta-analysis to systematically investigate
how emotion concept words alter brain activity in emotion. If
emotion words had no impact on how the brain represented
emotion, then this would suggest that language is indeed epi-
phenomenal to emotion (Ekman and Cordaro, 2011). In contrast,
if the neural basis of emotions is fundamentally different when
emotion concept words are present vs absent in tasks, then this
would suggest that emotion words are impacting emotional ex-
periences and perceptions in more than trivial ways.
Meta-analysis is particularly advantageous for addressing
questions about the role of language in emotion because meta-
analysis reveals brain regions that are consistently activated
during certain conditions, even when individual studies were
not specifically designed to address the hypothesis at hand. In
the present meta-analysis, we coded individual contrasts from
386 studies containing 7333 participants reporting peak coordin-
ates from 876 contrasts (see Supplementary Table S1 in
Supplementary Material). Studies were published between 1993
and the end of 2014. Studies were coded to indicate whether
those contrasts included experimental tasks with emotion
words or affect words present. We hypothesized that the pres-
ence of emotion words anywhere throughout a task would im-
plicitly prime emotion concepts, causing participants to draw
on conceptual knowledge of certain discrete emotion categories
when making meaning of initial affective predictions about
stimuli. This would in turn, reduce the ambiguity of those initial
affective predictions by refining them as being about an in-
stance of anger, fear, etc. We thus predicted that experimental
contrasts in which emotion concept words were present would
be associated with consistent activations in brain regions
involved in the retrieval and representation of semantic know-
ledge, such as ventrolateral prefrontal cortex and aspects of the
lateral temporal lobe (including superior temporal gyrus and
anterior temporal lobe) (Visser et al., 2010). In contrast, in stud-
ies that did not explicitly include emotion concept words
throughout their experiment, we predicted that participants
would be relatively less likely to access emotion concepts and
thus fail to further elaborate on and refine initial affective pre-
dictions into experiences and perceptions of discrete emotions,
causing those initial affective predictions to remain ambiguous.
We thus predicted that contrasts in which emotion words were
absent we would observe consistent activity in the amygdala,
an aspect of the salience network particularly activated by un-
certainty (Whalen, 2007). Finally, we predicted that when com-
pared to emotion concept words, affect words (e.g. ‘unpleasant’,
‘pleasant’) would have less of an impact on the neural basis of
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emotional experiences and perceptions because they would not
provide the same amount of refinement about the meaning of
initial affective predictions.
Methods
Database
The database of studies used in this meta-analysis included fMRI
and PET studies that employed tasks related to emotional (e.g.
anger, fear, disgust, happy, sad, etc.) and affective (e.g. positive
and negative) experiences and perceptions published between
January 1993 and December 2014. See Supplementary Materials
for specific details about the database and a list of studies
included. We began by coding contrasts from individual studies
to indicate whether the experimental tasks included emotion
concept words or not, and the frequency with which emotion
words were present in that task. For example, contrasts were
considered to have emotion words present if they contained
words that were present in verbal or visual instructions at points
throughout the task (e.g. an instructions screen at the beginning
of each experimental block told participants they would see
‘angry’ faces on the next block of trials) or if words were present
on the screen in every trial (e.g. asking for ratings of discrete emo-
tions with response options like ‘anger’, ‘disgust’, etc. after the
neural response to the stimulus was modeled on every trial). To
be able to titrate the effect of the presence of emotion concept
words, we separated contrasts that had a lot of word priming (e.g.
on every trial throughout the contrast; Level 2; 33 studies) and
those that had relatively less (e.g. at the beginning of end of
blocks; Level 1; 67 studies). Studies were considered to not have
emotion words present (Level 0; 264 studies) if the methods
section explicitly reported that no emotion words were used or if
the methods did not mention the use of emotion words during
instructions, as response options, or as stimuli. To be conserva-
tive, studies were not included if they included the very minimal
use of emotion words prior to scanning (e.g. emotion words were
present in a behavioral task performed prior to scanning, or
included in a verbal instruction phase conducted outside of the
scanner). Of note, half the studies including emotion words mod-
eled the neural response to an emotionally evocative stimulus (e.
g. an image, autobiographical memory, scenario, sound, facial ex-
pression, etc.) separately from portions of the task in which any
words were on screen. Thus, in many studies, the only difference
between Levels 0, 1 and 2 contrasts were that emotion words had
not been primed (Level 0) or had been primed (Levels 1 and 2) at some
point preceding emotional experiences and perceptions.
To address the role of emotion concept words vs more gen-
eral affect words, contrasts were additionally coded for the
presence of affect-related words in tasks. Coding followed that
for emotion words, but specifically applied to affect-general
words such as ‘positive’, ‘negative’, ‘pleasant’ and ‘unpleasant’
(Level 2; 13 studies; Level 1; 49 studies; Level 0; 319 studies. We
focused specifically on words describing valence since this
described the majority of affect-related words in tasks (i.e.
arousal words were less frequent).
Multilevel kernel density analysis
The present meta-analysis used a Multi-level Kernel Density
Analysis (MKDA) (Wager et al., 2007) implemented in NeuroElf
(http://neuroelf.net). This technique summarizes the overlap in
peak activations from individual study contrasts in order to re-
port voxels that show consistent increases in activation for a
Fig. 1. Regions with greater activity for the (A) emotion categorization> gender categorization contrast include clusters in left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), and left dorsal an-
terior insula and left superior temporal gyrus and (B) gender categorization> emotion categorization contrast include clusters in right and left parahippocampal gyrus
(PHG), amygdala, and right declive, culmen and fusiform gyrus.
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Table 1. Effect of emotion words on emotion experience and perception
Region x y z k Max Mean
Contrast: emotion words present > not present (Levels 1 and 2 > Level 0)
R Superior Temporal Gyrus 48 10 11 351 0.07 0.05
R Superior Temporal Gyrus 48 10 11 0.07 0.05
R Superior Temporal Gyrus 50 5 2 0.06 0.05
R Superior Temporal Gyrus 50 10 18 0.06 0.05
R Superior Temporal Gyrus 52 13 2 0.06 0.05
R Inferior Frontal Gyrus 47 15 5 0.06 0.05
R Superior Temporal Gyrus 50 4 14 0.06 0.05
R Middle Temporal Gyrus 50 3 19 0.05 0.05
L Superior Temporal Gyrus 53 51 15 234 0.09 0.05
L Superior Temporal Gyrus 53 51 15 0.09 0.06
L Superior Temporal Gyrus 50 51 11 0.07 0.05
L Superior Temporal Gyrus 53 44 17 0.06 0.05
L Superior Temporal Gyrus 54 49 8 0.06 0.05
L Superior Temporal Gyrus 49 45 12 0.06 0.05
Contrast: emotion words not present > present (Level 0 > Levels 1 and 2)
R Parahippocampal Gyrus/Amygdala 23 7 10 1416 0.20 0.10
L Parahippocampal Gyrus/Amygdala 21 4 12 1191 0.16 0.08
L Parahippocampal Gyrus/Amygdala 21 4 12 0.16 0.09
L Parahippocampal Gyrus/Amygdala 31 5 15 0.13 0.07
L Lentiform Nucleus/Putamen 26 11 6 0.11 0.07
L Fusiform Gyrus 39 52 14 680 0.1 0.06
L Fusiform Gyrus 39 52 14 0.1 0.06
L Fusiform Gyrus 39 56 9 0.09 0.06
L Cerebellum (Declive) 39 58 16 0.09 0.06
L Fusiform Gyrus 37 50 9 0.09 0.06
L Fusiform Gyrus 36 42 10 0.07 0.05
L Fusiform Gyrus 43 62 10 0.07 0.06
R Fusiform Gyrus 30 46 12 398 0.07 0.05
R Fusiform Gyrus 30 46 12 0.07 0.05
R Inferior Occipital Gyrus 43 75 3 0.07 0.05
R Middle Occipital Gyrus 46 79 8 0.07 0.05
R Fusiform Gyrus 40 49 12 0.06 0.05
R Middle Occipital Gyrus 40 77 5 0.06 0.05
R Fusiform Gyrus 46 54 11 0.06 0.05
R Inferior Occipital Gyrus 37 76 7 0.06 0.05
R Fusiform Gyrsu 41 59 12 0.05 0.05
R Fusiform Gyrus 46 68 7 0.05 0.05
Contrast: emotion words every trial > throughout task (Level 2 > Level 1)
L Middle Temporal Gyrus 45 62 6 371 0.14 0.1
L Middle Temporal Gyrus 45 62 6 0.14 0.11
L Middle Temporal Gyrus 44 66 12 0.13 0.11
L Middle Occipital Gyrus 43 70 4 0.12 0.1
L Middle Temporal Gyrus 48 62 1 0.1 0.1
L Middle Temporal Gyrus 43 62 1 0.1 0.1
L Middle Occipital Gyrus 53 71 8 0.1 0.09
L Middle Temporal Gyrus 48 71 11 0.1 0.09
Contrast: emotion words throughout task > every trial (Level 1 > Level 2)
L Subcallosal Gyrus 15 2 12 555 0.19 0.12
L Subcallosal Gyrus 15 2 12 0.18 0.12
L Subcallosal Gyrus 21 4 13 0.18 0.13
L Parahippocampal Gyrus/Amygdala 27 3 14 0.17 0.12
L Parahippocampal Gyrus/Amygdala 25 3 16 0.17 0.12
L Lentiform Nucleus 12 0 5 0.13 0.10
L Parahippocampal Gyrus/Amygdala 24 9 17 0.15 0.11
Contrast: emotion words throughout task > no words (Level 1 > Level 0)
L Cerebellum (Culmen) 4 53 13 289 0.10 0.06
L Cerebellum (Culmen) 4 53 13 0.10 0.06
L Cerebellum (Declive) 10 59 17 0.07 0.06
(continued)
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given meta-analytic contrast (e.g. emotion words present vs not
present). The MKDA treats each individual contrast as the unit of
analysis, rather than each individual study, which keeps single
studies that report several highly related contrasts from unduly
influencing the meta-analytic results. Contrasts from all studies
assessing emotional experiences and perceptions were included
in the present meta-analysis, including contrasts assessing a dif-
ference in neural activity between emotion categories (e.g. anger
vs disgust) and those assessing neural activity associated with a
specific emotion category (e.g. anger vs neutral).
Following the standard MKDA procedure (Wager et al., 2007;
Kober et al., 2008; Lindquist et al., 2016b), coordinates from each
study contrast were first convolved with 12 mm spheres to pro-
duce binary indicator maps. The resulting maps for each con-
trast were then weighted to control for differences in sample
size and rigor of statistical analysis: each individual contrast
map was weighted by the square root of the sample size used so
that studies with higher sample sizes would have greater influ-
ence on the results, and studies which used fixed-effects ana-
lyses were down-weighted by 0.75 to reduce their contribution
to the meta-analytic results. Finally, we computed meta-
analytic contrasts to assess the role of emotion and affect words
in shaping neural activity associated with emotion (described in
more detail below). For each meta-analytic contrast, inferences
were made by comparing the proportion of study contrasts that
report activation in a given voxel to an empirically derived null
distribution created using Monte Carlo simulations. On each
simulation, an MKDA map was calculated based on the probabil-
ity of a particular proportion of studies reporting activation near
a given voxel, and was compared to a null distribution calculated
through random sampling of scrambled peak activations across
the whole brain, excluding ventricles and white matter. Five
thousand simulations were performed for each voxel-level ana-
lysis and voxels surpassing the primary threshold of P < 0.001
were retained. The resulting maps were cluster-level thresh-
olded using a family wise error rate of P < 0.05.
Isolating the effect of emotion words
In our first analysis, we wanted to implement the most conser-
vative test of the hypothesis that emotion concept words im-
pact the neural representation of emotions. To do this, we
Table 1. (continued)
Region x y z k Max Mean
R Cerebellum (Culmen) 10 51 14 0.07 0.05
R Superior Frontal Gyrus 8 50 30 267 0.07 0.06
R Superior Frontal Gyrus 8 50 30 0.07 0.06
L Medial Frontal Gyrus 0 50 28 0.07 0.06
L Superior Frontal Gyrus 11 48 29 0.07 0.06
Contrast: no emotion words > emotion words throughout task (Level 0 > Level 1)
R Parahippocampal Gyrus/Amygdala 27 5 12 1052 0.18 0.09
R Parahippocampal Gyrus/Amygdala 27 5 12 0.18 0.09
R Amygdala 23 7 7 0.17 0.12
R Lentiform Nucleus 17 7 4 0.14 0.09
R Lentiform Nucleus 25 9 2 0.14 0.08
L Parahippocampal Gyrus/Amygdala 31 7 10 746 0.12 0.07
L Parahippocampal Gyrus/Amygdala 31 7 10 0.12 0.08
L Parahippocampal Gyrus/Amygdala 31 5 15 0.11 0.07
L Parahippocampal Gyrus/Amygdala 22 9 12 0.11 0.07
L Parahippocampal Gyrus/Amygdala 21 4 12 0.11 0.07
L parahippocampal Gyrus/Hippocampus 24 14 11 0.10 0.07
L Lentiform Nucleus/Putamen 25 9 1 0.09 0.06
L Lentiform Nucleus 18 13 4 0.09 0.07
L Claustrum 31 2 3 0.08 0.06
L Superior Temporal Gyrus 35 3 12 0.08 0.06
L Parahippocampal Gyrus 22 14 15 0.07 0.06
L Fusiform Gyrus 39 52 12 818 0.12 0.08
L Fusiform Gyrus 39 52 12 0.12 0.08
L Cerebellum (Declive) 39 58 16 0.1 0.07
L Fusiform Gyrus 43 62 6 0.09 0.07
R Fusiform Gyrus 44 56 12 828 0.1 0.06
R Fusiform Gyrus 44 56 12 0.1 0.07
R Fusiform Gyrus 36 49 8 0.1 0.07
R Middle Occipital Gyrus 50 68 5 0.08 0.06
R Middle Occipital Gyrus 44 77 7 0.07 0.06
R Inferior Occipital Gyrus 43 71 2 0.07 0.06
R Inferior Occipital Gyrus 46 77 2 0.07 0.06
R Inferior Occipital Gyrus 45 77 3 0.06 0.06
L Middle Occipital Gyrus 53 69 9 329 0.09 0.06
L Middle Occipital Gyrus 53 69 9 0.09 0.06
L Middle Occipital Gyrus 48 69 4 0.08 0.06
L Inferior Temporal Gyrus 47 73 1 0.06 0.06
Note: voxel-wise P < 0.001, cluster-wise FWER P < 0.05.
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sought a meta-analytic contrast that would isolate the pres-
ence vs absence of emotion concept words while keeping con-
stant as many other task features as possible. We thus
targeted consistent neural activity that was associated with
labeling faces with emotion words vs. labeling faces with gen-
der words, and vice-versa. There were 23 studies including 66
contrasts in our database that asked participants to categorize
emotional stimuli (in particular, faces and voices) with emo-
tion labels and 34 studies including 86 contrasts in our data-
base that asked participants to categorize similar stimuli by
gender (Supplementary Table S1 in Supplementary Material).
Importantly, both types of studies used emotional facial or
vocal expressions as their target stimuli and required partici-
pants to use a category label to make a response on every trial,
meaning that the only difference between the conditions was
the presence of emotion or gender words. Making this com-
parison also reduced the likelihood that there were differences
between the conditions related to degrees of attention or cog-
nitive control enlisted by the tasks. To assess the difference be-
tween emotion and gender categorizations, we computed two
meta-analytic contrasts: (1) ‘emotion words present’ vs ‘gender
words present’, and (2) ‘gender words present’ vs ‘emotion
words present’.
Demonstrating the broader effect of emotion words on the neural
representation of emotions. After completing the first, narrower,
test of our hypothesis, we extended our analysis to our entire
database of studies to assess whether our results would gener-
alize across a wide variety of experimental tasks (see
Supplementary Materials for details on the tasks and stimuli
used by the studies). This analysis was less controlled than the
first set of analyses we ran since studies varied in the tasks they
employed. However, this analysis was more powerful, insofar
as it examines whether the impact of emotion concept words
on the neural basis of emotion generalizes across a variety of
experimental contexts. To first assess the role of emotion words
in shaping neural activity related to a variety of emotional ex-
periences and perceptions, we computed two meta-analytic
contrasts: (1) ‘emotion words present’ vs ‘emotion words not
present’, and (2) ‘emotion words not present’ vs ‘emotion words
present’. Here, we examined the effect of any emotion words
present (Levels 1 and 2) vs no words present (Level 0) and vice
versa. We also ran four additional contrasts to assess incremen-
tal effects caused by varying degrees of emotion concept know-
ledge present in experimental tasks: (1) ‘emotion words present
in every trial’ vs ‘emotion words present throughout the task’
(Level 2> Level 1), (2) ‘emotion words present throughout the
task’ vs ‘emotion words present in every trial’ (Level 1> Level 2),
(3) ‘emotion words present throughout the task’ vs ‘emotion
words not present’ (Level 1> Level 0) and (4) ‘emotion words not
present’ vs ‘emotion words present throughout the task’ (Level
0> Level 1).
Testing the effect of emotion words on the neural
representation of experiences and perceptions of
emotion and positive and negative emotions
To examine whether language played a comparable role across
all types of emotional states (experiences or perceptions and
positive or negative emotions), we next computed the main
contrasts ‘emotion words present’ vs ‘emotion words not pre-
sent’ (Levels 1 and 2> Level 0), and ‘emotion words not present’
vs ‘emotion words present’ (Level 0> Levels 1 and 2) on four
subsets of the database: (1) studies of emotion experience
including positive and negative emotions, (2) studies of emotion
perception including positive and negative emotions, (3) studies
of emotion experience and perception which focused on nega-
tive emotions and (4) studies of emotion experience and percep-
tion which focused on positive emotions.
Testing the effect of affect-related words
Finally, to examine whether emotion concept words had a dif-
ferential impact on the neural basis of emotions than affect
words, we performed two analyses. First, we computed a meta-
analytic contrast comparing the presence of emotion concept
words (Levels 1 and 2) with the presence of affect words (Levels
1 and 2). Second, we replicated the main emotion word analyses
with affect words [any affect word present (Levels 1 and 2)>no
affect word present (Level 0)].
Results
Isolating the effect of emotion words
The first meta-analytic contrast focused on studies of emotional
face and voice perception where categorization of either emo-
tion or gender was required on every trial. Within this subset of
the database, we computed two meta-analytic contrasts: emo-
tion words present> gender words present and gender words pre-
sent> emotion words present (Figure 1A and B). We observed a
single cluster in the left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG; centered on
47, 15, 4; k¼ 998) for the emotion words present> gender words
present contrast. The left IFG is implicated in semantic retrieval
and use (Thompson-Schill et al., 1997; Grindrod et al., 2008;
Huang et al., 2012), consistent with our constructionist hypoth-
esis that emotion words prompt retrieval of emotion concepts.
Also consistent with predictions, we observed clusters in the
right amygdala and left PHG (centered on 24, 10, 22; k¼ 761
and 24, 14, 24; k¼ 385) for the gender words present> emotion
words present contrast. That the amygdala had more frequent
activation to facial and vocal expressions in the presence of
gender words suggest that in the absence of emotion words, the
affective meaning of faces may be relatively more ambiguous
and prompt further processing in the brain. Finally, we observed
consistent activity in the cerebellum (right declive centered on
32 50 16; k¼ 502) for this contrast.
Demonstrating the broader effect of emotion words on
the neural representation of emotions
After running the emotion words present> gender words present
analysis on a subset of the database, we sought to observe
whether the impact of emotion words generalized to the rest of
the database, including both studies of emotion experience and
perception and a much larger variety of experimental tasks. For
the main emotion words present> emotion words not present (Levels
1 and 2> Level 0) contrast (Table 1), we observed consistent acti-
vations in large clusters of voxels in the right and left superior
temporal gyrus (STG) and right medial temporal gyrus and in-
ferior frontal gyrus (Figure 2A), all regions that are consistently
implicated in semantic retrieval and use (Visser et al., 2010;
Binder et al., 2009).
We also examined regions that were modulated by the pres-
ence of emotion words by isolating regions that had more fre-
quent activations when emotion words were not present
relative to when they were present. For this emotion words not
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present> emotion words present contrast (Level 0> Levels 1 and 2)
(Table 1), we observed a set of findings similar to those observed
when gender words, but not emotion words were present.
Specifically, we observed consistent activation in clusters in bi-
lateral amygdala/parahippocampal gyrus (PHG) and bilateral fu-
siform gyrus (Figure 2B).
To assess whether any incremental effects could be
observed between tasks with varying frequencies of emotion
words present (i.e. emotion words present on the screen in
every trial vs included in instruction screens at the beginning of
each block), we computed four additional contrasts across the
whole database (Table 1). For the emotion words present in every
trial> emotion words present throughout the task (Level 2> Level 1)
contrast, we observed consistent activations in left middle tem-
poral gyrus extending to middle occipital gyrus. For the emotion
words present throughout the task> emotion words present in every
trial (Level 1> Level 2) contrast, we observed consistent activa-
tions in a large cluster anchored in the left subcallosal gyrus,
including left amygdala and PHG.
For the emotion words present throughout the task>no emotion
words present (Level 1 vs Level 0) contrast, we observed a pattern
similar to the emotion words present> emotion words not present
(Levels 1 and 2> Level 0) contrast. In particular, we again found
consistent activations in right STG. We also found consistent
activations in the left medial frontal gyrus, right superior frontal
gyrus, and aspects of the cerebellum. For the emotion words not
present> emotion words present throughout the task (Level 0> Level
1) contrast, we again observed consistent activations in bilateral
amygdala/PHG, fusiform gyrus and middle occipital gyrus.
Testing the effect of emotion words on the neural
representation of emotion experiences or perceptions
The results for studies that focused on emotion experience
were generally consistent with those observed for our targeted
facial expressions contrast as well as our contrasts on the
broader database of experience and perception studies (Table
2). For studies of emotion experience when emotion words were
Fig. 2. Regions with greater activity for the (A) emotion words present> emotion words not present contrast include clusters in left and right superior temporal gyrus (STG)
and (B) emotion words not present> emotion words present contrast include clusters in bilateral PHG and amygdala and bilateral fusiform gyrus.
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present>no emotion words present (Levels 1 and 2> Level 0), we
observed consistent activations in a cluster located in the
cerebellum. In contrast, when no emotion words were pre-
sent> emotion words present (Level 0> Levels 1 and 2) we
observed clusters in bilateral amygdala/PHG and left fusiform
gyrus.
The results for studies that focused on emotion perception
also revealed a similar pattern of activations to the results from
our previous analyses. For studies of emotion perception when
emotion words were present>no emotion words present (Levels 1
and 2> Level 0), there were no consistent activations at our pri-
mary threshold, but we observed consistent activations in a sin-
gle cluster located in the right STG at P < 0.005. For studies of
emotion perception when no emotion words were present> emotion
words present (Level 0> Levels 1 and 2), we observed consistent
activations in clusters in bilateral amygdala/PHG. Taken to-
gether, the consistency of the findings when assessed separ-
ately for studies of emotion experience and perception suggests
Table 2 Effect of emotion words on emotion experience or perception
Region x y z k max mean
Contrast: emotion experience, emotion words present > not present (Levels 1 and 2 > Level 0)
R Cerebellum (Fastigium) 6 58 22 302 0.09 0.06
R Cerebellum (Fastigium) 6 53 19 0.09 0.07
R Cerebellum (Culmen) 4 50 18 0.08 0.06
R Nodule 0 56 24 0.07 0.06
R Cerebellum (Declive) 8 63 18 0.07 0.06
R Cerebellum (Declive) 4 59 16 0.06 0.05
R Nodule 1 52 28 0.06 0.05
Contrast: emotion experience, emotion words not present > present (Level 0 > Levels 1 and 2)
R Parahippocampal Gyrus/Amygdala 23 3 13 1087 0.19 0.10
R Lentiform Nucleus/Putamen 31 9 6 0.10 0.07
L Parahippocampal Gyrus/Amygdala 27 3 15 1031 0.16 0.08
L Parahippocampal Gyrus/Amygdala 22 9 12 0.15 0.09
L Parahippocampal Gyrus/Amygdala 30 9 11 0.14 0.09
L Lentiform Nucleus/Medial Globus Pallidus 16 11 6 0.10 0.07
L Parahippocampal Gyrus/Hippocampus 24 14 11 0.10 0.07
L Lentiform Nucleus/Putamen 25 9 1 0.07 0.06
L Superior Temporal Gyrus 35 3 12 0.07 0.06
L Fusiform Gyrus 41 56 10 682 0.11 0.07
L Fusiform Gyrus 46 54 11 0.11 0.08
L Fusiform Gyrus 41 54 15 0.11 0.08
L Parahippocampal Gyrus 38 44 8 0.09 0.07
Contrast: emotion perception, emotion words present > not present (Levels 1 and 2 > Level 0)*
R Superior Temporal Gyrus 48 18 1 609 0.11 0.07
R Superior Temporal Gyrus 55 19 1 0.10 0.07
R Superior Temporal Gyrus 55 16 4 0.10 0.07
R Superior Temporal Gyrus 54 9 0 0.10 0.07
R Superior Temporal Gyrus 62 5 2 0.09 0.07
R Superior Temporal Gyrus 53 3 2 0.08 0.06
R Superior Temporal Gyrus 47 5 1 0.08 0.07
R Precentral Gyrus 51 2 8 0.07 0.06
R Precentral Gyrus 47 9 8 0.07 0.06
R Superior Temporal Gyrus 47 8 4 0.07 0.06
R Insula 40 23 5 0.07 0.06
R Middle Temporal Gyrus 57 22 9 0.07 0.06
R Superior Temporal Gyrus 64 8 6 0.06 0.06
Contrast: emotion perception, emotion words not present > present (Level 0 > Levels 1 and 2)
R Sub-lobar Amygdala 25 9 10 1252 0.25 0.14
L Parahippocampal Gyrus/Amygdala 25 1 16 839 0.19 0.11
L Parahippocampal Gyrus/Amygdala 28 7 16 0.19 0.11
L Parahippocampal Gyrus/Amygdala 22 7 11 0.16 0.11
L Inferioir Frontal Gyrus 32 6 9 0.13 0.09
L Lentiform Nucleus/Putamen 29 0 5 0.11 0.08
L Parahippocampal Gyrus 14 13 13 0.09 0.08
Note: voxel-wise P < 0.001, except where noted by *P < 0.005, cluster-wise FWER P < 0.05.
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that the results from the whole database were not solely driven
by studies on emotion experience or emotion perception.
Consistent with psychological constructionist hypotheses
(Lindquist et al., 2015a), language may play a similar role in emo-
tion whether involved in making meaning of sensations in-
ternal to one’s body (as in emotion experiences) or sensations
external to one’s body (as in perceptions of someone else’s fa-
cial, bodily or vocal expressions).
Testing the effect of emotion words on the neural
representation of positive or negative emotions
For studies of negative emotion experiences and perceptions
when emotion words were present>no emotion words present
(Levels 1 and 2> Level 0), we observed no consistent activa-
tions at P < 0.001. However, we observed consistent activations
in one cluster in the left claustrum, extending to STG and dor-
sal anterior insula at P < 0.005. Like the STG, the claustrum and
dorsal anterior insula have been implicated in semantic re-
trieval during priming (Rossell et al., 2001; Rissman et al., 2003).
For studies of negative emotion experiences and perceptions
when no emotion words were present> emotion words present
(Level 0> Levels 1 and 2) we again observed consistent activity
within bilateral amygdala/PHG and the left fusiform gyrus at P
< 0.001 (Table 3). For studies that focused on positive emotion
experiences and perceptions, we found no consistent activa-
tions at any threshold when emotion words were present>no
emotion words present (Levels 1 and 2> Level 0) contrast. This
finding may be related to the fact that studies often only in-
clude a single positive emotion category (happiness), which
limits the brain’s need to retrieve and differentiate between
same-valence concepts when making meaning of positive af-
fective predictions. However, for the no emotion words pre-
sent> emotion words present (Level 0> Levels 1 and 2) contrast
we once again observed clusters in bilateral amygdala/PHG
(Table 3).
Testing the effect of affect-related words
Finally, to specifically address our predictions that emotion
words would be more effective at reducing amygdala activity
than affect words, we ran a meta-analytic contrast comparing
frequent brain activations in studies that used emotion words
vs affect words. In the emotion words present> affect words present
Table 3. Effect of emotion words on negative or positive emotions
Region x y z k max mean
Contrast: negative emotions, emotion words present > not present (Levels 1 and 2 > Level 0)*
R Claustrum 30 8 2 559 0.10 0.06
R Lentiform Nucleus/Putamen 17 5 2 0.08 0.06
L Lentiform Nucleus/Putamen 24 11 3 0.08 0.06
R Claustrum 36 2 4 0.08 0.06
R Superior Temporal Gyrus 50 5 2 0.07 0.06
R Middle Temporal Gyrus 48 4 15 0.07 0.05
R Superior Temporal Gyrus 48 12 12 0.06 0.05
R Insula 44 11 1 0.06 0.05
R Insula 42 1 6 0.06 0.05
R Insula 41 14 6 0.06 0.05
R Middle Temporal Gyrus 47 1 18 0.06 0.05
Contrast: negative emotions, emotion words not present > present (Level 0 > Levels 1 and 2)
R Parahippocampal Gyrus/Amygdala 23 7 10 1226 0.25 0.12
L Sub-lobar Amygdala 22 7 9 1084 0.19 0.10
L Parahippocampal Gyrus/Amygdala 27 1 15 0.19 0.10
L Parahippocampal Gyrus/Hippocampus 30 9 16 0.17 0.11
L Parahippocampal Gyrus/Hippocampus 26 14 11 0.14 0.10
L Lentiform Nucleus/Medial Globus Pallidus 16 11 6 0.13 0.08
L Fusiform Gyrus 41 56 12 517 0.11 0.08
L Fusiform Gyrus 47 58 11 0.10 0.08
L Fusiform Gyrus 43 58 17 0.10 0.07
L Fusiform Gyrus 44 48 13 0.09 0.07
L Inferior Occipital Gyrus 43 68 5 0.07 0.06
Contrast: positive emotions, emotion words not present > present (Level 0 > Levels 1 and 2)
R Parahippocampal Gyrus/Amygdala 25 3 14 665 0.21 0.13
R Lentiform Nucleus/Lateral Globus Pallidus 19 3 8 0.19 0.13
R Sub-lobar Amygdala 25 11 7 0.18 0.12
L Parahippocampal Gyrus/Amygdala 25 1 16 457 0.18 0.11
L Parahippocampal Gyrus/Amygdala 28 9 13 0.15 0.11
L Subcallosal Gyrus 27 4 14 0.13 0.10
L Claustrum 32 8 6 0.13 0.10
L Insula 39 17 1 0.12 0.10
L Insula 28 16 3 0.12 0.10
L Inferior Frontal Gyrus 41 19 4 0.11 0.10
Note: voxel-wise P < 0.001, except where noted by *P < 0.005, cluster-wise FWER P < 0.05.
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contrast, we observed a cluster in STG (Figure 3A), replicating
previous findings that emotion concept words prompt semantic
processing. In contrast, in the affect words present> emotion words
present contrast, we observed consistent amygdala activity
(Figure 3B), replicating our previous analyses and underscoring
the fact that affective predictions remain ambiguous in the
presence of affect, but not emotion words.
To examine more closely how affect words impacted on the
neural basis of emotion, we next focused specifically on experi-
mental contrasts that contained only affect words. In the affect
words present>no affect words present, we did not find any clusters
that survived the P < 0.001 threshold. However, at the very lenient
threshold of P < 0.05, we observed a large cluster in the parahipp-
campal gyrus/amygdala. There were no significant activations for
no affect words present> affect words present. Together, these findings
suggest that as predicted, the presence of affect words in studies
did not serve the same function as emotion words.
Discussion
In the present meta-analysis, we found that emotion words im-
pact the neural representation of emotion, as reflected by more
frequent activations in the IFG, STG and MTG when emotion
words are present across emotional experiences and
Fig. 3. Regions with greater activity for the (A) emotion words present>affect words present contrast include clusters in left middle temporal gyrus, and right STG and (B) af-
fect words present> emotion words present contrast include clusters in bilateral PHG/amygdala, left cingulate gyrus and left and right culmen.
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perceptions. The IFG is routinely implicated in semantic re-
trieval (Thompson-Schill et al., 1997; Grindrod et al., 2008; Huang
et al., 2012) and the STG and middle temporal gyrus also have an
undisputed role in language (Friederici et al., 2003; Bigler et al.,
2007). More anterior portions of STG, such as what we observed
in our meta-analysis, are involved in the representation of se-
mantic knowledge and are thought to be a hub in a distributed
semantic network containing the IFG, lateral temporal cortices,
medial temporal lobe and midline cortical areas such as the
medial prefrontal cortex and posterior cingulate cortex (see
Visser et al., 2010 for a meta-analysis). Together, these findings
suggest that tasks involving emotion words prompted semantic
retrieval and use of relevant emotion concept knowledge during
the experience and perception of emotions. This is notable
given that in many experiments in our database, the neural re-
sponse to an emotional stimulus was modeled separately from
the neural response to emotion words involved in instructions
or trial-by-trial labeling—thus our findings do not merely reflect
processing words per se but accessing conceptual knowledge
during emotional experiences and perceptions.
In contrast, when emotion studies across the literature did
not involve emotion words, we consistently observed frequent
amygdala activity. In fact, we observed frequent amygdala ac-
tivity any time emotion concept words were not present in a
task. Our findings are consistent with a role for the amygdala in
signaling uncertainty about the meaning of affective sensations
when emotion concept knowledge is not readily accessible (as
predicted by a psychological constructionist approach; see
Lindquist et al., 2015a). This hypothesized role of the amygdala
is also consistent with recent accounts suggesting that the
amygdala more generally responds to uncertainty, arousal and
the ‘motivational salience’ of visual stimuli in particular
(Cunningham and Brosch, 2012; Touroutoglou et al., 2014).
According to the psychological constructionist view, the uncer-
tainty of the meaning of affective stimuli is resolved when con-
ceptual knowledge about emotion is made more readily
accessible and used to categorize the meaning of affective
sensations.
Frequent amygdala activity even occurred in the more con-
servative case of gender vs emotion categorizations of emo-
tional facial expressions and when affect words were present,
suggesting that not just any type of words decrease the fre-
quency of amygdala activity—the effect appeared to be specific
to the presence of emotion concept words across studies. This
is likely because emotion concept words name discrete emotion
concepts that help refine the meaning of otherwise ambiguous
affective states. Once a person categorizes unpleasant affect as,
e.g. fear, he knows what his affective state means, what to do
about it, and even how to regulate it. This process would in turn
decrease the arousing nature of those stimuli, performing an
implicit emotion regulation function (Lieberman, 2011).
Consistent with this interpretation, when emotion words were
absent from paradigms, we also observed more frequent activa-
tions in the parahippocampal gyrus and aspects of ventral tem-
poral cortex (e.g. fusiform), suggesting that participants may
have been engaging in increased episodic memory retrieval and
sensory processing to make meaning of the affective stimuli
they were experiencing and perceiving in the absence of readily
available emotion concept knowledge. The parahippocampal
gyrus is also implicated in the processing of visual context
(Aminoff et al., 2013), potentially suggesting a greater reliance
on contextual cues to resolve uncertain affective experiences in
the absence of specific conceptual knowledge. Given the role of
the fusiform in downstream visual processing important for
successful object and face recognition (Haxby et al., 2001), fre-
quent activations in this region when words are not present
could reflect more elaborate visual processing of emotional
stimuli when conceptual knowledge is not readily available to
make meaning of visual input.
Implications
Taken together, our findings are consistent with the psycho-
logical constructionist hypothesis that language helps consti-
tute emotion by representing conceptual knowledge that is
necessary to make meaning of otherwise ambiguous affective
states. These findings are important in that they begin to shine
light on the dynamics of neural systems that help construct
emotions. It is common to observe increased activity within
brain regions associated with semantics during emotions
(Kober et al., 2008; Vytal and Hamann, 2010; Lindquist et al.,
2012; see Lindquist et al., 2015a). However, it is unclear from
these findings whether language is merely an epiphenomenon
to emotion, only labeling emotions after the fact, or whether
these regions are performing another function entirely. In con-
trast, our meta-analytic neuroimaging findings suggest that the
mere presence vs absence of emotion words in a task change
emotional brain activity in a consistent manner.
The idea that affective feelings are ambiguous in the ab-
sence of conceptual knowledge about emotion is consistent
with findings suggesting that ‘affect labeling’ helps a person
regulate their feelings (Pennebaker and Beall, 1986; Lieberman,
2011). Understanding more specifically what you are feeling
helps you know what caused the feeling and what to do
about it. It is thus no surprise that learning to label feelings is
at the core of many types of psychotherapy. Similarly, re-
conceptualizing the meaning of a feeling with a different lin-
guistic category (as in the cognitive reappraisal tasks used in
standard emotion regulation paradigms) would also help regu-
late emotions by helping transform one type of experience (e.g.
fear) into another (e.g. anger). Not surprisingly, reappraisal, al-
though it does not explicitly involve affect labeling, involves
many of the same brain regions involved in semantics such as
the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, medial prefrontal cortex,
anterior temporal lobe and posterior cingulate cortex (Buhle
et al., 2014; Burklund et al., 2014). There is debate about whether
the processes involved in emotion regulation are the same or
different than those involved in emotion generation (Gross
and Barrett, 2011), but evidence suggests that the neural mech-
anisms involved in both are similar (Ochsner et al., 2012).
These findings underscore the psychological constructionist
point that conceptualization is a fundamental ‘ingredient’ in
emotions (Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 2011; Lindquist, 2013;
Barrett, 2014).
The present meta-analysis is also an important step in ex-
tending behavioral research (Lindquist et al., 2015a,b) that inves-
tigates the impact of language on emotion. Our results are
particularly striking given the wide variety of tasks included in
our meta-analytic database. That the general pattern of less fre-
quent amygdala activity when words are present holds for the
entire database of studies strongly suggests emotion words con-
fer an implicit emotion regulation effect, but none of the studies
included in our database assessed emotion regulation. Showing
that the mere presence of emotion words can confer this con-
sistent effect is a pivotal step in investigating the degree to
which language is constitutive of emotion. These findings add-
itionally present a cautionary methodological note, as re-
searchers studying emotion should be as aware as possible of
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how subtle task characteristics such as the inclusion of emotion
words can actually have a large influence over the affective
processes under investigation (Kassam and Mendes, 2013).
Limitations
Despite its promises, this work is limited by existing neuroimag-
ing meta-analysis techniques, which rely on studies with sub-
traction analyses to isolate regions more frequently activated for
one task condition vs another. Additionally, a general issue with
neuroimaging meta-analysis is that one can never truly know
the details and idiosyncrasies of every individual task that com-
prises the meta-analytic database in use, and further, whether
there are qualitative differences between the tasks in each meta-
analytic conditions used (e.g. ‘words present’ vs ‘words not pre-
sent’) that could bias the results. For instance, it is possible that
meta-analytic conditions differed in the amount of arousal con-
tent shown, cognitive load or in other task demand characteris-
tics. Our examination of the database did not reveal systematic
differences in the arousal content (furthermore, most neuroi-
maging studies tend to use highly arousing stimuli; see Lindquist
et al., 2016b). However, it remains a possibility that there are un-
known qualitative differences that impacted our findings.
Nonetheless, we are reassured by the fact that our findings repli-
cate the findings of single ‘affect labeling’ neuroimaging studies
(Hariri et al., 2000; Lieberman et al., 2007) that tightly control for
these confounds, suggesting that these additional confounds do
not likely account for our findings. Furthermore, the stability of
our findings across our different analyses reduces this concern;
we demonstrate the same effects when we restricted our ana-
lyses to a tightly controlled subset of the database (in which both
emotion and gender labeling conditions were nearly identical in
terms of task constraints) as well as when examining a more het-
erogeneous set of contrasts using different methods of inducing
emotional experience and perceptions.
Our meta-analysis is also limited more specifically by which
hypotheses can be tested at the meta-analytic level. Future re-
search should advance our meta-analytic results using individ-
ual neuroimaging studies to address more fine-grained
questions about the parametric role of labeling on brain activity
and how language impacts activity within and between broad-
scale neural networks supporting core affect and conceptualiza-
tion. Another possibility for future neuroimaging studies would
be to use multivariate techniques to assess whether patterns of
neural activity elicited by emotional stimuli can be classified by
the degree of conceptual knowledge present in the task. We
look forward to future research that will continue to explore the
important, yet often overlooked, role of language as it shapes
our experiences, perceptions and regulation of emotions.
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